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ABSTRACT
The basic competitive model with freely available technology is suited for static industries but
misleading as applied to major innovative economies for which development of new technologies
equals  in  magnitude  around  10%  of  gross  domestic  investment.  We  distinguish  free  generic
technology from proprietary technologies resulting from risky investment with uncertain outcome.
The totality of possible outcomes drives the national innovation system and the returns to a particular
successful technology cannot be compared to its own direct investment costs. Eureka moments are
hardly ever self-enabling and incentives are required to motivate investment attempting to turn them
into an innovation. The alternative to a valuable proprietary innovation is not the same innovation
freely available but the unchanged generic technology. Growth is concentrated in any country at any
time in a few firms in a few industries that are achieving metamorphic technological progress as a
result of breakthrough innovations. 
So long as the entry and exit of firms using the generic technology sets the price in an industry, one
or more price-taking firms can coexist with proprietary technologies yielding more or less substantial
quasi-rents to the sunk development costs. Consumer welfare is increased if an innovator creates a
proprietary technology such that the market equilibrium price is reduced and output increased. If the
technological breakthrough is sufficiently large for the innovator to drive all generic producers out
of the industry and increase output as a wealth-maximizing monopolist, consumer welfare is surely
increased.  After  some  time,  the  innovative  technology  will  diffuse  into  an  imitative  generic
technology. The best innovators develop a stream of innovations so that technological leaders can
maintain their status as dominant firm or monopolist for extended periods of time despite lagged
diffusion, and consumers benefit from this stream as well. The economics of an innovative nation
are different from those of the no-growth stationary state which we teach and fall back on. We
propose an ambitious agenda to integrate major research streams treating innovation as an object of
economic analysis into our standard models.
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The world’s leading economies are characterized by national innovation systems which 
encourage development of embryonic inventions into successful commercial innovations that 
reduce  costs  or  improve  the  qualities  of  existing  products  or  create  entirely  new  products.  
Innovation  is  driven  by  appropriable  opportunity.
1    Appropriability  in  part  depends  on 
government enforcement of intellectual property rights, but may also depend on the nature of the 
innovation.    Opportunity  involves  creative  insight,  and  frequently  arises  from  scientific 
discovery that makes possible the previously impossible.  Innovation has its critics:  it raises 
standards of living generally, but among producers the gains are concentrated and frequently 
achieved by the emergence of new firms and industries that may become quite large and displace 
existing firms and workers.  Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” evokes the economic churning 
– rise and fall, entry and exit – caused by rapid “disruptive” technological progress. 
  The  core  of  our  argument  is  to  differentiate  between  a  generic  technology  (and  its 
associated  production  and  cost  functions)  which  is  available  freely  to  any  potential  industry 
entrant and a proprietary technology which is the result of risky investments by a particular firm 
and not freely available to any entrant.  The generic technology corresponds to the traditional 
concept of technology and may be embodied in physical and/or human capital which is available 
to  entrants  at  a  given  market  price  which  may  or  may  not  depend  on  the  amount  of  these 
resources used by the industry.
2  A proprietary technology may be more or less protected by 
patents, copyrights, trade secrets, actual secrecy, and/or natural excludability, any or all of which 
reduce the speed and completeness of imitation by other new or existing firms in the industry.
3  
A  fundamental  condition  for  firms  to  invest  in  creating  a  proprietary  technology  is  that  the 2 
expected return from using the technology resulting from the investment instead of the generic 
technology equals or exceeds the cost of the investment.  This cannot happen if the technology is 
freely available to all entrants since no returns would accrue to the technology.  It is a fallacy to 
conduct a positive or normative analysis on the assumption that the technology is free to all when 
it would not exist in that case.  It is worse to blame the innovator for being inconsistent with our 
traditional model. 
Some legal and institutional arrangements are more conducive to scientific breakthroughs 
which create technical opportunity, and to converting inventive inspiration (the eureka moment) 
into actual new commercial technology.
4  For example, intellectual property protections vary 
greatly as does the possibility of venture financing and public offerings for innovative start-ups; 
anti-trust  law  and  policy  can  undo  the  market  outcomes  of  great  innovators,  reducing  the 
incentive  for  any  other  inventor  to  try  to  emulate.    Reducing  a  great  idea  –  an  embryonic 
invention – to practice is an expensive, failure-prone process and the expected returns have to 
cover the costs, or it will not be pursued.  As shown in Table 1, in the major innovative nations, 
R&D expenditures average upwards from 2 percent of GDP, an amount equal in magnitude to 
about 10 percent of gross expenditures for creation of new physical capital.
5 
The  reality,  excitement,  hope,  and  costs  of  innovation  are  entirely  absent  from  the 
received  standard  model  of  perfect  competition  as  incorporated  in  hundreds  of  textbooks 
(hereafter RSM).  If our long run is simultaneously optimal and hopeless, our science is dismal.  
The  RSM  assumes  a  technology  described  in  the  production  function  –  an  engineering 
relationship describing the maximum amount of output that can be produced from any given 
combination of inputs – that is freely available to all industry participants.  The cost function of 
(efficient)  firms  is  then  derived  using  this  production  function  and  input  prices.    The  same 3 
conception  of  production  and  cost  functions  is  routinely  applied  in  models  of  monopolistic 
competition,  monopoly,  and  oligopoly.    That  is,  technology  is  neither  a  produced  means  of 
production  nor  an  object  of  (as  opposed  to  given  for)  economic  analysis.    This  concept  is 
consistent with the long-run of a stationary state and – if exogenous change is permitted – even 
the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model, but not with the reality of investment in research 
and development to produce new technologies.   
We propose some amendments to the RSM and monopoly models which make them 
consistent with the production function as an economic object while preserving important results 
and pedagogical tractability.  The objective is to synthesize key insights of the growing but still 
separate  economics-of-science-and-technology  and  new-growth-theory  literatures  and 
incorporate  that  synthesis  into  revised  RSM  and  monopoly  models.    The  specific  concepts 
developed here are mostly familiar to participants in those literatures, but their implications in 
the RSM and monopoly models may still surprise. 
  Whether the amendment proposed here is adopted depends on its usefulness in improving 
the conclusions derived from the RSM and monopoly models.
6  We develop four important new 
results in the following sections:  (a) There can be a competitive equilibrium with proprietary 
technologies which dominates the RSM equilibrium in the Pareto-welfare sense.  (b) A firm 
profitably innovating a proprietary technology need not face a downward-sloping demand curve 
for its output.  (c) Consumer welfare is increased only if the innovative technology increases the 
quantity sold and reduces the market price.  (d) This surely occurs if the innovating firm drives 
out all competitors and becomes a monopoly firm operating in the downward-sloping region of 
its demand curve.  In section I we develop the concept of proprietary technology and point to a 
substantial  literature  that  firms  adopting  proprietary  technologies  are  the  primary  means  of 4 
economic growth.  The first two propositions characterizing a competitive equilibrium with an 
innovating firm are developed in Section II.  The model for an innovating firm which emerges as 
a dominant firm is presented in Section III.  Next, we consider the case of an innovating firm 
which creates a proprietary technology for which the wealth-maximizing strategy drives out all 
firms using the generic technology, creating a welfare-enhancing monopoly.  In Section V, we 
introduce imitation which limits the incentives for innovation as it diffuses the cost reduction to 
other firms in the industry.  A concluding section summarizes the paper and proposes an agenda 
of future work to apply the same concepts of technology to other market models. 
 
I. Generic and Proprietary Technologies 
  Figure 1 from Lamkey (2005) illustrates corn output per acre of farmland used in the 
United States before and after the arrival of hybrid seed corn around 1935.  The RSM applies 
naturally to conditions to the left of 1935:  There is a single, unchanging best way to produce 
corn and anyone operating a farm has learned it either from parents or farm school.  If anyone 
invented any part of the technology, that has long since entered free common knowledge and 
use.  Zvi Griliches (1957) pioneered the study of economically rational technological change by 
examining the order of introduction (as well as speed of adoption by farmers) of hybrid seed 
corn.  Darby and Zucker (2006) emphasize that the hybrid seed corn revolution was the result not 
of a scientific breakthrough which enabled agronomists to develop better hybrid corn species 
than they knew how to do, but instead was based on appreciation of the commercial importance 
of a scientific discovery which prevented farmers from saving seed from their crops so that they 
had to purchase hybrid seed corn each year from its inventor:  It was not that cross-breeding to 5 
achieve  superior  crops  was  previously  unknown,  it  was  that  double-cross-breeding produced 
appropriability which motivated seed companies to invest resources in inventing better seed.
7 
  No  one  today  can  deny  the  importance  of  commercial  innovation  in  seed  corn  in 
producing ever  rising standards of living and social welfare.  The enabling invention which 
started this process – only later augmented by establishment of intellectual property rights as a 
result of proven benefits – was a method of inventing which could not be readily copied by new 
entrants.    Students  of  science  and  technology  have  long  wrestled  with  differences  between 
dynamic and static welfare illustrated by this example:  Once a seed corn is invented, social 
welfare is maximized (in the static sense) by making the new technology freely available.  But if 
that is done, then there is no expected return to motivate the innovation in the first place and the 
seed corn is never invented, resulting in dynamic inefficiency.  Put differently, welfare analysis 
is fundamentally flawed if it ignores the cost of and incentives for innovating a technology, and 
examines technologies only after they have been invented and reduced to practice.
8 
I.A. Self-Enabling versus Embryonic Inventions 
    Genius is one per cent inspiration and ninety-nine per cent perspiration. 
–  Thomas A. Edison (spoken circa 1903, 
  published Harper's Monthly, 1932) 
  The arguments over static and dynamic welfare in part reflect two polar opposite views of 
the knowledge constituting technology.  One view is that an invention is created in an “epiphany 
of insight” or “eureka moment” and once this occurs can be easily understood and used by 
anyone of reasonable intelligence.  Early proponents of this view are Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962).  More recently Romer (1990) argues that technological change is well characterized as 
“improvement in the instructions for mixing together raw materials,” not inherently tied to a 6 
human being as human capital, and thus inherently nonrivalrous.
9  If pride of authorship, points 
toward  tenure,  or  book  royalties  from  publication  provide  sufficient  incentives  for  all  such 
eureka  moments  to  be  codified  and  published,  such  self-enabling  inventions  are  reasonably 
described as free gifts of nature which do not require economic motivation for creation or for 
introduction to the market since any producer has to make the same investment and faces the 
same cost conditions to enter the market.  Our best candidate for an example of a self-enabling 
invention is how to create hybrid corn seed which does not self-propagate (discussed above); this 
was an invention of a method of an inventing – a conceptual research tool – which could be 
understood and applied readily although it took nearly two decades after publication before it 
resulted in the creation and marketing of any actual seed. 
At the other extreme, the same eureka moment is seen as producing only an embryonic 
invention which requires much cooperative investment to reduce it to practice and bring it to 
market as an innovation.
10  For example, the embryonic invention might be to use a specific 
receptor on a cell to control or cure a disease.  Going from there to a successful innovation might 
involve developing a prototype molecule that would fit on that receptor, using combinatorial 
chemistry to create thousands of variants of the prototype, cloning the receptor so that the variant 
molecules can be screened for which best bind to the receptor, and then identifying the drug-
candidate molecules.  These candidates then must be tested for activity versus diseased human 
cells in the Petri dish and activity and safety in animal models.  If there are any surviving drug-
candidates, one is picked as the best candidate for the very expensive human tests required to 
prove safety and effectiveness.  On the order of 20 percent of the drug candidates that enter 
clinical trials actually make it through to FDA approval for marketing.   DiMasi, Hansen, and  
Grabowski (2003) estimate that the total R&D cost per new drug approved at 802 million in year 7 
2000 dollars, of which nearly half is accounted for by the cost of capital between outlays and 
eventual approval.  After a drug candidate resulting from an embryonic invention is approved, a 
major investment in marketing is still required to educate harried physicians on the benefits of 
the product relative to other treatment strategies. 
  Our reading of the literatures on the economics and sociology of science and technology 
is that self-enabling inventions are extremely rare in the history of technological innovation.  The 
great bulk of innovations are embryonic and follow Edison’s famous inspiration-perspiration rule 
requiring much time and resources to turn the embryonic invention into an innovation in product 
or production.  Clearly, most embryonic inventions do not succeed as innovations even after the 
investment of time and resources.  About half of granted patents are allowed to expire by the end 
of ten years rather than pay relatively small renewal fees (Griliches 1990).  We speculate that the 
vast majority of embryonic inventions are never pursued in the sense of actual investment or 
resources  in  an  attempt  to  reduce  them  to  practice,  principally  due  to  a  lack  of  incentives, 
resources, or vision on the part of the inventors. 
Governments can do little with respect to vision, but can affect incentives and resources 
for good or ill.  For example, by 1990, 33 and 40 percent of U.S. and Japanese star bioscientists 
had actively worked with firm scientists to the point of publishing a joint paper, as compared to 
only 7 percent in Europe (Zucker and Darby 1999).  The rank correlation between prevalence of 
star scientists working in research institutes and star-firm articles was -0.71.  (Co-publishing with 
firm  scientists  has  proven  to  be  a  robust  indicator  of  transfer  of  tacit,  naturally  excludable 
technology at the bench level.)  We argue that the key factor is the difference in incentives from 
American  and  Japanese  professors  for  European  star  in  research  institutes  whose  employees 
typically get no share of royalties on an invention and cannot participate in founding a new firm 8 
while retaining their job at the institute.  Besides the apparent differences in the star bioscientists 
transferring  their  embryonic  technology  to  industry,  we  doubt  that  the  lack  of  industry 
connection  on  the  part  of  the  remaining  67  and  60  percent  of  American  and  Japanese  stars 
represents a lack of embryonic inventions on their part. 
  The most important policy of most countries with respect to incentives for innovation is 
the patent law.  A good analogy for the role of a patent for an embryonic invention such as a 
drug candidate is that of the deed for the land on which a skyscraper will be built.  Once clear 
title to the land is secured, the investment in erecting the building makes sense.  If instead the 
building were erected on public land, the building will benefit the public but likely bankrupt the 
builder.  Without the patent on a drug candidate, no rational pharmaceutical company would 
invest in testing whether it was a safe and effective medicine, since – if they were to succeed – 
numerous rivals could produce the drug by investing the small cost of proving it chemically 
equivalent.  The market price for the drug would be sufficient to cover only productions costs 
and the cost of proving chemical equivalence; the original investment in proving it safe and 
effective and trying many other failed drug candidates would be a loss to the investing firm. 
I.B. Introduction of Proprietary Technologies as the Main Engine of Growth 
  Harberger (1998) has documented that growth is generally concentrated in a few companies 
in a few industries which are achieving dramatic real cost reductions.  Darby and Zucker (2003) 
have generalized his results to include introduction of new products or qualities of products and 
distinguish between normal perfective growth and metamorphic growth which transforms existing 
industries or forms new ones. Theorists following Jovanovic (1982) have developed models in 
which  entry,  exit,  and  reallocation  of  production  among  firms  with  varying  productivity  drive 
productivity change at the industry level.  Bartelsman and Doms (2000) have recently reviewed the 9 
associated empirical literature using business-level microdata that demonstrates that within-industry 
firm turnover and reallocation shape changes in industry level productivity.  Indeed, “these results 
begin to cast doubt on the appropriateness of an aggregate production function that is based on a 
representative firm.”  (p.584)  Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2005) present evidence that countries 
with more displacement and actual decline of their ten largest firms between 1975 and 1996 
experienced faster economic growth in the 1990s.  These results are all consistent with the young 
Schumpeter’s belief (1912, recanted by 1942) in the importance of creative destruction by entry 
of new firms as a driving force for growth. 
  The industries undergoing metamorphic growth change over time.  Famous examples from 
the  past  include  spinning,  weaving,  steam  engines,  steel,  glass,  electricity,  and  aircraft.    More 
current  examples  would  be  semiconductors,  information  technology,  biotechnology,  and 
nanotechnology.  The source of the driving innovations for metamorphic change may be internal or 
external to the industry, with external innovations using different technological bases the most 
threatening to existing firms in a transforming industry (Tushman and Anderson 1986). 
The good news for the RSM is that most industries at any given time are characterized by 
little if any technological progress.  Unfortunately, ignoring the exceptions – industries with firms 
achieving  metamorphic  progress  –  is  fundamentally  misleading  not  only  with  respect  to 
understanding  technological  progress  but  also  in  understanding  industrial  organization  and  the 
welfare implications of market structures resulting from particular firms generating technological 
progress via purposive, wealth-maximizing investment in R&D. 
 10 
II. Competitive Equilibrium with a Proprietary Innovator 
  If pressed, most economists would agree that it is possible for some entrepreneurs to have 
technologies superior to that of the typical firm using what we call the generic technology.  A 
rare  example  of  a  textbook  discussing  such  infra-marginal  firms  is  Friedman  (1976)  who 
attributes these differences as related to superior entrepreneurial capacity.  While the existence of 
firms with superior entrepreneurial capacity means that all firms will not be identical as in the 
RSM,  entry  and  exit  of  the  generic-technology  firms  will  continue  to  determine  long-run 
equilibrium.  The firm or firms with superior entrepreneurial capacity may earn above-normal 
returns and differ in size from the standard firms, but they will have no effect on the long-run 
price  and quantity in the industry.
11  Thus, our  characterizing some firms in an industry  as 
having proprietary technologies resulting from risky investment might be dismissed as merely 
relabeling  entrepreneurial  capacity,  but  not  adding  anything  of  substance  to  the  RSM.    We 
believe our amendment is important, however, because it lays the groundwork in this paper for 
understanding  proprietary  technology  as  a  produced  means  of  production  not  only  for  a 
competitive industry as discussed in this section, but also as the firm grows large and faces a 
downward-sloping demand curve with or without any surviving competitors using the generic or 
imitative technologies (Sections III-V). 
  Consider  a  scientist,  engineer,  or  other  potential  or  current  entrepreneur  with  an 
embryonic invention which could reduce costs of producing an existing product or introduce an 
entirely new product or a new quality in an existing product at a cost which will be valued by 
consumers by more than the cost increase required to produce it using the new technology.  The 
inventor knows that there is some probability that the idea will fail and needs to formulate some 
assessment of the probability and returns to be earned with different degrees or types of success.  11 
If those expected returns are sufficient and the inventor has sufficient capital to self-finance, he 
or she will proceed to try to convert the invention to an innovation in the marketplace.  Absent 
self-finance,  the  inventor  will  face  a  cost  of  capital  which  depends  on  the  organization, 
efficiency, expectations, and risk tolerance of the venture capital market.  We will restrict our 
discussion in this section to inventors who can self-finance reduction to practice of a cost-saving 
innovation  for  an  existing  product.    The  other  complications  are  discussed  in  the  remaining 
sections or added to the agenda for future research. 
  The long-run industry equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.  The long-run equilibrium 
price P is determined by entry and exit as in the RSM and equal to the minimum average cost of 
the generic firms.  Firm 1 using a proprietary technology produces q1 where marginal cost MC1 
equals P at an output greater than its own minimum average cost.  The cost curves for firm 1 are 
drawn conventionally excluding the cost of the proprietary technology.  The shaded area equal to 
q1(P-AC1) is the quasi-rent returns to the proprietary technology.  In any particular case, the net 
present value of these returns over the life of the technology can be greater or less than the cost 
of creating the proprietary technology.  If expectations are rational, however, on average the 
NPV of returns to implemented proprietary technologies over all market structures (including 
those  described  in  future  sections)  must  exceed  the  expected  cost  of  those  technologies  by 
enough to compensate for the failed R&D projects which either produce no new technology or 
one with higher minimum average cost than the generic technology.  Noting that generic firm 
outputs q2 = q3 = … = qn = qgeneric are measured relative to correspondingly shifted origins 02, 03, 
… , 0n, the proprietary-technology firm which could be quite large crowds out of the market q1/ 
qgeneric  firms,  but  does  not  affect  equilibrium  output  and  price  in  the  market  in  industries 
characterized by a horizontal long-run supply curve.  A firm with a proprietary technology can 12 
shift an upward- or downward-sloping long-run supply curve if it uses more or less of a scarce 
input than the firms it displaces or otherwise has disproportionate externalities on the other firms 
in the industry. 
  Note that the long-run equilibrium price and quantity are undisturbed (with caveats for 
externalities) if there is more than one proprietary-technology firm so long as some generic firms 
remain in the market so that their long-run minimum average cost determines the price in the 
long run.  Thus independent inventors or imitators do not affect the quasi-rents to a proprietary 
technology  so  long  as  the  combined  output  of  the  proprietary-technology  firms  is  less  than 
sufficient to supply the quantity demanded at a price equal to the generic long-run minimum 
average cost. 
  As in the RSM, the demand curve Di faced by each firm i is the industry excess demand 
curve with its own output subtracted: 
(1)    Di = DM – (SM –Si), 
where DM is the market demand curve, SM is the market supply curve inclusive of firm i, and Si is 
the supply curve of firm i.  That is, SM￿i = (SM –Si) is the supply curve of all firms in the market 
except i, including potential entrants in the long run.  The price elasticity Ei of the firm’s demand 
curve Di at the equilibrium price and output is given by the formula: 
(2)    Ei = (EM/￿i) – {[(1-￿i)/￿i]eM￿i} = [EM – (1-￿i)eM￿i]/￿i 
where EM is the price elasticity of demand for the market, ￿i is the firm’s fractional share of the 
market, and eM￿i is the elasticity of supply of all other firms (including potential entrants for the 
long-run demand curve).  So long as the share of firm i is small, say 0.001, we say that the firm 
will behave as a price taker because the first term will be so large for any value of EM which we 
are likely to encounter.  However, suppose that the innovation is metamorphic and the firm has a 13 
large share of market output, say 0.5.  A wealth-maximizing firm will still behave as a price taker 
if the elasticity of supply of other firms is sufficiently large, and that quantity eM￿i is infinite in 
the  RSM  long  run  with  the  usual  caveat  on  the  absence  of  pecuniary  or  other  externalities 
affecting the market equilibrium.   
  A myopic short-run-profit maximizer might attempt to reduce output and raise price, to 
equate short-run marginal revenue and marginal cost, but the resulting entry of new generic firms 
will reduce future prices and profits for an extended period.  This apparent contradiction between 
profit maximization and wealth maximization reflects the failure to account in myopic marginal 
revenue for the higher future profits associated with higher levels of current output. 
  In  summary,  we  have  demonstrated  in  this  section  that  there  can  be  a  competitive 
equilibrium with proprietary technologies.  Even if its equilibrium size is large relative to the 
market,  an  innovative  firm  employing  proprietary  technology  will  face  a  horizontal  demand 
curve and act as a price-taker so long as the supply elasticity of other firms is large, as under the 
conditions corresponding to long-run equilibrium with entry and exit of generic firms.  While the 
proprietary-technology firm is clearly better off given its innovation to be in the market, generic 
firms earn the same returns in this and other markets and so the displaced firms are no worse off 
in  long  run  equilibrium.    However,  a  full  welfare  analysis  requires  consideration  of  all  the 
possible  outcomes  of  an  investment  attempting  to  convert  an  embryonic  invention  into  an 
innovation.  Note also that if the innovation can be embodied in a “black-box” machine (or seed) 
which cannot be copied or reverse engineered, the innovator must compare the costs and returns 
of entering the product market or the market which produces machinery for the product market.  
Similarly, if the innovation could be licensed to all market participants with effective protection 
for intellectual property rights, that route may be the preferred by a wealth-maximizing inventor. 14 
 
III. The Metamorphic Innovator as a Dominant Firm 
  Metamorphic  innovations  –  here,  a  major  cost  reduction  which  reduces  the  average 
minimum cost of production by a large percentage – can result in a firm which produces a large 
fraction of the market output.  This occurs where the proprietary technology has a much larger 
output at the minimum average cost and/or a very flat marginal cost curve.  We will analyze this 
case by reinterpreting the traditional dominant firm model. 
  We  first  observe  that  the  traditional  dominant  firm  model  with  a  fringe  of  (generic) 
competitors does not apply to a constant-cost (horizontal generic-firm-supply-curve) industry 
because the dominant firm’s long-run demand curve given in equation (1) has infinite elasticity 
and, the firm behaves as a price taker as we saw in the previous section.  Thus the discussion in 
this section is confined to the case of an upward-sloping long-run supply curve for an industry 
originally made up solely of generic firms. 
Figure 3 is the standard dominant firm model, traditionally used to analyze the pricing 
behavior of a dominant producer firm 1 (say, OPEC) given the supply of a competitive fringe of 
price-takers.  This figure can similarly illustrate the wealth-maximizing output for an innovating 
firm  1  which  replaces  much  but  not  all  of  the  production  of  the  generic  firms,  leaving  a 
competitive fringe.  Before firm 1 enters, we would have the RSM long run competitive solution 
in which a large number of generic firms produce an industry output of Q' which is sold at the 
market  clearing  price  P'.    Now  the  demand  curve  faced  on  entry  by  firm  1  is  simply  the 
negatively sloped excess demand curve D1 of the generic industry.  The demand for the output of 
firm 1 is thus 0 at the competitive price P' and increases until it corresponds to the entire market 
demand  curve  at  prices  so  low  that  all  generic  firms  have  left  the  market.    The  wealth-15 
maximizing innovator firm 1 produces Q1 where its long-run marginal cost MC1 equals its long-
run marginal revenue MR1, which can occur to the left or right of firm 1’s minimum long-run 
average cost.  Given firm 1’s output Q1, the generic firms will supply QM￿1 for a total market 
output of Q* corresponding to the market clearing price P* on the market demand curve.  Note 
that consumers unambiguously benefit from the entry of the dominant firm since the new market 
price P* is lower than the competitive (generic-firms only) equilibrium price P'. 
Figure 4 presents the conventional static welfare analysis.  Entry of the innovating firm 1 
increases consumer surplus by the entire trapezoid bounded by the horizontal lines at P' and P*, 
the  vertical  axis  and  the  industry  demand  curve,  but  the  unshaded  portion  of  this  gain  to 
consumers is producer surplus lost by the generic firms.  The lighter shaded triangle on the right 
is the pure gain in consumer surplus.  The darker shaded triangle to its left represents resources 
released from this industry but not counted in the third component of social welfare gain which is 
the producer surplus of firm 1 measured by the lightly shaded quasi-rents rectangle representing 
firm 1’s output Q1 times its margin between P* and its average costs (again exclusive of the cost 
of the innovation).  Thus, in this case consumers are unambiguously better off and their gains 
more than offset the loss of producer surplus by the generic firms.  In addition, social welfare is 
enhanced by resources released from the industry and by the producer surplus of firm 1. 
This static welfare analysis is fundamentally incomplete even if the gains are compared 
to the actual costs of creating the particular proprietary technology utilized by firm 1.  It leaves 
out the uncertainty of the outcome – of which creating a dominant firm is only one possibility 
and failure is another.  Therefore, welfare analysis must properly be applied only to the totality 
of the national innovation system and not to particular outcomes. 16 
There  is  a  difficulty  in  the  standard  dominant  firm  model  generally  including  its 
application here to a major innovator.  The difficulty arises from taking the supply curve of the 
generic industry as independent of the output of firm 1 and taking the cost conditions of firm 1 as 
independent of the output of the generic firms.  When the model is applied to an extractive 
industry in which there are different qualities of deposits and the dominant firm has a vastly 
larger, high quality deposit, the cost-independence assumptions make perfect sense.  But then the 
fringe of price takers can hardly be characterized as identical generic producers.  Upward sloping 
supply curves for more standard industries are usually justified either by increases in industry 
output driving up the supply price to all firms of a scarce specialized input or by technical 
connections  among  the  generic  firms  as  when  they  use  a  common  resource  such  as  fishing 
grounds, clean water, or clean air. 
If the innovative technology does not require the scarce or common resource then Figures 
3 and 4 are properly drawn.  Suppose instead that the innovative technology only reduces, for 
example, the amount of the scarce input used per unit of output.  Then a second generic-firm 
supply curve SM￿1 should be drawn given the equilibrium firm 1 output (and implied use of the 
scarce input) Q1 and the cost curves for firm 1 should be drawn given the equilibrium generic 
firm output QM￿1.  Taking account of these interdependencies both reduces the illustrated gains 
from the innovation and greatly complicates the diagram.  We leave the detailed analysis to our 
agenda for future research. 
 
IV. The Metamorphic Innovator as Welfare-Enhancing Monopolist 
Next, we consider the case of an innovating firm which creates a proprietary technology 
for  which  the  wealth-maximizing  strategy  drives  out  all  firms  using  the  generic  technology, 17 
creating a monopoly despite freedom to enter using the generic technology.  Figure 5 essentially 
replicates Figure 3, except in this case the innovation results in long run marginal costs that 
intersect the marginal revenue of firm 1 to the right of the output Q'' at which all generic firms 
leave the market.
12  This analysis applies equally to the case in which the generic industry is 
characterized by a horizontal supply curve and firm 1 becomes a price searcher only at prices 
below the minimum long-run average cost of the generic firms.
13  The innovating firm’s optimal 
price and output are given by P* and Q*.  While consumers do not benefit from the innovation in 
the case of a constant-cost generic industry when the innovating firm does not drive out all firms, 
they do if this occurs and output is increased beyond Q''.  Consumers benefit in increasing-cost 
generic industries in any case, but benefit more when all generic firms are driven out of the 
industry by low prices which maximize the innovating firm’s wealth. 
Note  that  this  is  not  predatory  pricing.    The  firm  is  not  driving  competition  out  of 
business to raise prices.  The innovating firm’s long-run optimal price is so low that no firm 
using the generic technology can earn a normal return and so all exit.  The generic technology is 
no longer viable.   
In the case of new products, there was no prior generic industry because there was no 
known way to produce the product at a cost consumers would be willing to pay.  Since the 
consumers now have a choice that they value, they are clearly benefited by the new product. 
Figure 5 is drawn with a sharp intersection of the generic supply curve SM￿1 with the 
vertical axis.  This implies that the demand curve of the innovating firm D1 will have a kink at 
the price P'' and output Q'' at which the last generic firms exit the industry.  As a result of this 
assumption, the marginal revenue drops at this point.  As illustrated in Figure 6, the innovating 
firm will not choose to increase output beyond Q'' or lower price below P'' if its marginal cost 18 
curve happens to intersect the marginal revenue curve in the vertical portion representing this 
discontinuity in the price elasticity of demand.  This behavior is sometimes referred to as limit 
pricing.  Consumers are no worse off than before the innovation and are in fact better off in the 
case of an increasing-cost generic industry.  The innovating firm 1 would of course be better off 
if its innovation reduced costs further so that marginal cost intersected marginal revenue to the 
right of Q'', but there are bound to be some examples in which the special case occurs. 
  Often, but not necessarily, innovations which result in the market structures discussed in 
this section are preferable outcomes compared to those analyzed in Sections II and III from the 
point of view of the innovator.  An informal poll of economists, including a number specializing 
in industrial organization, suggests it is more surprising that consumers are generally better off 
and always no worse off if a major innovation resulting in a monopoly for the innovating firm 
occurs.  Once again, the difference from the traditional view of monopoly is recognizing that 
innovative  technologies  are  produced  in  expectation  of  returns,  and  would  not  exist  if  the 
innovation were instead made freely available to any entrant. 
 
V. The Metamorphic Innovator with Imitation 
  Thus far we have made reference to particular innovation as occurring in the context of a 
national innovation system which results in numerous attempted innovations, some of which are 
complete failures, others are an improvement but do not cover even their own sunk costs for 
R&D  much  less  the  risk  of  failure,  and  yet  others  which  are  very  to  fabulously  successful.  
Another aspect of success, however, is that it breeds imitation which both limits the duration of 
the returns and shifts benefits of the innovation to consumers generally over and above any 
initial benefits from increased consumer surplus. 19 
  Patented innovations enter the public domain after a fixed limit of time, or earlier if 
renewal fees are not paid.  Imitation takes many forms:  Patents often can be invented around 
because  they  are  rarely  broad  enough  to  cover  the  insight  underlying  the  eureka  idea.    For 
example, the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory scientists J. Georg Bednorz and K. Alexander 
Müller won the 1987 Nobel Prize in Physics for their 1986 breakthrough discovery that a rare-
earth ceramic was superconducting at much higher temperatures than metals.  However, others 
quickly  discovered  different  rare-earth  ceramics  which  were  superconducting  at  even  higher 
temperatures, including the commercially important 77 K (-196°C or -321°F) boiling point of 
nitrogen, rendering the IBM patent on the original ceramic of no economic value.  In other cases, 
such as recombinant DNA, the techniques used to make the discovery involve so much tacit 
knowledge that natural excludability limits the ability of other scientists to apply and invent 
around the discovery. 
Here  we  consider  simple  imitation  (such  as  at  patent  expiration)  in  which  previous 
proprietary technologies are incorporated into the generic technology with a lag of T years.  Thus 
after T years any innovation earns its user only the normal return to the costs to any new entrant.  
If there is no intervening innovation, the RSM will apply and all the benefits of the innovation 
are shifted to the consumers (and possibly the owners of scarce specialized inputs whose value is 
enhanced by the innovation). 
Many high-technology industries are characterized by ongoing innovation.  Consider here 
the case of a technology leader (firm 1) and a fringe of imitators using the technology leader’s 
technology of T years prior vintage.  We continue to concentrate on cost-saving innovations 
rather than quality improvements, but expect future research to obtain similar results for the 20 
latter types of ongoing innovation.  The equilibrium in any given  year can be illustrated by 
Figures 2, 3, 5, or 6, depending on the nature and pace of innovation.   
Assume for clarity that the technology leader’s R&D program is achieving ongoing cost 
reductions of R percent per year.  Then the minimum long-run average cost of firm 1 (MLRAC1) 
will equal a fraction of the imitative generic technology firms’ MLRACM￿1: 
(3)        MLRAC1 = MLRACM￿1/(1 + r)
T, 
where r = R/100.  In practice ongoing innovations tend to also shift out the output q(MLRACi) ￿ 
q*i corresponding to the MLRAC of firm i, so we assume an increasing scale growth rate S: 
(4)        q*1 = (1 + s)
T q*M￿1  
where s = S/100.  Further, the demand curve for the industry will shift out horizontally at a 
growth rate G equal to the income elasticity of demand for the product times the growth rate of 
aggregate income. 
V.A. Innovative Leader with Generic Imitators in Competitive Equilibrium 
Suppose that the generic and proprietary technologies involve no pecuniary or technical 
externalities so that the industry has a flat long-run generic supply curve at any instant of time 
which  is  shifting  downward  at  R  percent  per  annum  once  the  technology  leader  has  been 
innovating for more than the T-year life of a proprietary technology.  So long as there are some 
imitating generic firms, the equilibrium illustrated in Figure 7 will look essentially the same as in 
Figure 2 – competition with a proprietary technology.  Table 2 summarizes some results for this 
simple model of innovation with competitive imitation. 
The first thing to note is that with only a temporary cost advantage over its imitators, the 
innovative leader still enjoys a cost advantage k which is increasing in both the imitation lag T 
and the rate of innovative cost reduction per year R (or r in decimal terms).  Unless the marginal 21 
cost  curve  is  vertical  at  the  quantity  corresponding  to  MLRAC1,  the  innovative  leader  will 
produce more than that quantity and have a margin of quasi-rents toward its (excluded) R&D 
costs that is less than its percentage cost advantage.  The leader’s output will accordingly exceed 
that of a representative generic imitator by more than its absolute scale advantage.   Once  a 
steady-state growth equilibrium such as described by “Moore’s Law” has been achieved, total 
industry output will grow according to both income and price effects on demand.  Price falls at R 
percent per year governed by the fall in the imitators’ MLRACM￿1.  We cannot generally say 
whether industry sales will rise or fall relative to GDP or even in absolute terms, since this 
depends on the price elasticity of demand as well as the rates of fall in costs and income induced 
increases in demand.  It is similarly ambiguous whether the market share of the technology 
leader will increase, decrease, or stay steady.  This uncertainty arises because the growth in the 
size of the leader depends on the growth rate of the output corresponding to its MLRAC1, while 
the size of the industry will grow according to both income and price effects on demand.   
  There can be multiple innovating leaders in this industry with no strategic interaction so 
long as the imitative generic fringe can still be characterized as determining the industry price 
with an imitation lag behind the industry leaders.  However, even if the industry price is set by 
lagged imitation by generic imitators, multiple innovating leaders will likely involve strategic 
interaction on R&D since they are likely to be able to imitate each others innovations much more 
quickly than non-innovating imitators.  Therefore, we will leave further investigation of this 
market structure to future research. 
V.B. Continuing Metamorphic Innovation by a Welfare-Enhancing Monopolist 
  Analysis  of  the  case  of  a  monopolist  engaged  in  ongoing  innovations  which  are 
potentially usable by generic technology entrants after a lag T is similar to that for imitated price-22 
taking innovators, but inherently messier.  We examine only the shifting proprietary and generic 
technologies in Figure 8, leaving out the demand shifts which are of second order of magnitude 
for metamorphic progress and would further clutter the analysis.  Moving from one year to the 
next  (indicated  by  a  '  sign),  we  see  that  the  decline  in  the  cost  curves  due  to  technology 
improvement will reduce the wealth-maximizing price and increase the corresponding quantity 
of output.  This provides further benefits to consumers.  An interesting feature of this case is that 
the  lagged  availability  of  technological  improvements  to  potential  imitative  generic  entrants 
progressively lowers what would be the comparable competitive equilibrium price and the price 
at which some entry will occur.  Whether that feature has any impact would depend on the 
precise shape of the demand curve and position of the cost curves for the proprietary and generic 
technologies. 
  Addition of income-induced demand shifts over time as in Section V.A above would 
work  to  reinforce  the  increase  in  output  of  the  innovating  monopolist,  but  offset  the  price 
decrease in whole or part or even – if large enough relative to the pace of innovation – could lead 
to increasing prices over time.  Of course the same would be true for the competitive equilibrium 
price in a market with an upward-sloping supply curve which shifts down due to technology 
improvements while output is simultaneously shifting out due to higher income. 
 
VI. Conclusions and Agenda for Future Work 
  Invention, innovation, and technology have been long compartmentalized in economics, 
viewed as add-ons for specialists rather than playing any central role in the basic theory.  Indeed, 
the standard model’s dismissive theoretical treatment of technology as an engineering statement 
relating maximum possible output to each combination of inputs makes economists’ model of 23 
human  behavior  as  motivated  by  self-interest  appear  sophisticated  by  comparison.    This 
treatment is at variance with the fact that advanced economies generally spend 2-3 percent of 
GDP on research and development – an amount equal in magnitude to around 10% of gross 
domestic  investment.    As  a  leading  innovator,  American  corporate  wealth  is  increasingly 
concentrated in intellectual property. 
  Omission of technological change does not simply gloss over descriptive detail; it leads 
us astray when we make policy recommendations on subjects ranging from intellectual property 
to anti-trust policy.  Almost any economist would argue that R&D which leads to improved 
technology  at a  firm in a competitive industry  is better for  consumers  than one that creates 
conditions such that firm can and does drive all competitors out of business and sets prices as a 
monopolist.  But we have shown in this paper that exactly the opposite conclusion is correct.  If 
the competitive price-taking industrial organization is maintained, the generic firms set the price 
and all or most of the benefits of the innovation are likely to be captured by the innovator.  When 
the change is sufficiently large and increases scale advantage, the wealth-maximizing innovator 
sets a price lower than that at which any competitive firm using the generic technology can 
survive,  the  gains  to  consumers  are  assured  and  can  be  quite  large.    In  this  case  the  cost 
difference between the innovator and the generic firms is so great that the latter are irrelevant to 
the pricing decision of the innovator. 
The totality of possible outcomes drives the national innovation system, and the returns to 
a particular successful technology cannot be compared to its own direct investment costs. Eureka 
moments are hardly ever self-enabling and incentives are required for high-risk investment in an 
attempt to turn inspiration into innovation. The alternative to a valuable proprietary innovation is 
not the same innovation freely available but the unchanged generic technology. 24 
Growth is concentrated in any country at any time in a few firms in a few industries that 
are  achieving  metamorphic  technological  progress.  The  best  innovators  develop  a  stream  of 
innovations  so  that  technological  leaders  can  maintain  their  status  as  dominant  firm  or 
monopolist  for  extended  periods  of  time  despite  lagged  diffusion  into  the  free  generic 
technology, and consumers’ benefits grow larger over time as the cost saving grows. 
This paper has synthesized ideas developed by many scholars over many decades.  An 
impressive amount of the work was done by affiliates of the productivity program at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, led until recently by the sorely missed Zvi Griliches.  The first 
item on the agenda for future work which we are proposing is to make these lessons a central 
part of the economist’s standard model.  We believe we have made the case that can and should 
be done but have no illusions that our efforts here cannot be substantially improved.   
We have only essayed incorporating technological change in the form of cost reduction 
into the competitive, dominant firm, and monopoly models.  Much innovation takes the form of 
creating entirely new products or improving the characteristics of existing products.  We see the 
most  obvious  next  steps  to  integrate  such  innovations  (as  well  as  cost  reductions)  into 
monopolistic competition and oligopoly models. 
The ultimate goal is to develop models of innovation for the economy as a whole in 
which  new  industries  emerge  and  old  ones  decline  and  exit.    This  model  would  include  an 
explicit  role  for  advances  in  basic  science  and  engineering  and  conditions  shaping  the 
transmission of the new, often tacit knowledge to firms.  A way station on this path would be 
explicit treatment of the ongoing replacement by new innovators of firms grown large through 
prior innovation.   25 
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1 See, for example, Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, Winter (1995). 
2  The  generic  technology  differs  from  the  traditional  concept  of  technology  in  that  it  will 
generally  change  over  time  (as  discussed  below)  in  response  to  the  evolution  of  proprietary 
technologies. 
3 Natural excludability refers to the property of many discoveries at the scientific frontier which 
can not be practiced without learning the techniques by working at the bench level with those 
already adept; this property slows both diffusion to other scientists and imitation by other firms 
(Zucker, Darby, and Brewer 1998 and Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 1998).  Zucker, Darby, and 
Torero (2002) present empirical evidence of natural excludability in genetic engineering. 
4 For example, Zucker and Darby (1999) showed that countries which rely on national research 
institutes have a much lower percentage of their top “star” bioscientists involved in bench-level 
knowledge flows to firms than countries which rely more heavily on research universities as the 
locus of basic research.  Moser (2005) shows for the second half of the nineteenth century, that 
invention in countries without patent laws was limited to a small set of industries where there 
were  other  means  of  appropriability,  while  inventors  in  countries  with  patent  laws  were 
introducing  innovations  across  a  much  more  diversified  set  of  industries.    Lerner  and  Wulf 
(2006) report that larger incentives such as stock options and restricted stock for a firm’s R&D 
chief are associated with more patents with higher citation rates and generality. 
5 Neither Canada nor Italy invests as much in R&D as do the G-5 countries. 
6  We  believe  that  similar  improvements  result  in  monopolistic  competition  and  oligopoly 
models, but developing amended versions of those models is beyond the scope of this paper. 
7 Specifically, double-cross breeding produces a first generation crop which is valuable as seed 29 
 
but does not breed true so that a seed-saving farmer gets a mixture of the inferior constituent 
strains combined to create the seed corn.  Appropriability can be achieved through maintaining 
secrecy about the constituent strains that work for particular soil and climate conditions or – 
where available – by intellectual property rights over the use of those true-breeding strains.  The 
advent of effective property rights for seed corn permitted the switch from double-cross to true 
breeding single-cross seed corn beginning around 1960. 
8 This error is related to the “time inconsistency” problem in macroeconomics in which the 
central bank wants the public to believe that it is committed to fighting inflation in the future, but 
in the present increases money supply to lower unemployment since it cannot now affect the 
public’s current expectations. 
9  The  Arrow-Nelson-Romer  view  incorporates  two  distinct  ideas:  technological  change  is 
simple (cheap) and nonrivalrous.  The main argument in the text is concerned with the former.  
However, the latter is frequently not true either.  Cell lines may be cheaply reproducible but the 
production process involved in producing a drug based on a cell line may be quite complex 
involving  considerable  tacit  knowledge  embodied  in  particular  individuals.    Most  valuable 
proprietary technologies are quite complex and embodied in multiple individuals interacting in 
an organization’s task routines each of whom individually could not recreate the technology in a 
new organization (Nelson and Winter 1982).  While the organization is protected from the loss of 
any  particular individual by  redundant knowledge, a potential imitator  would have to hire  a 
constellation of employees to be able to practice the proprietary technology. 
10 U.S. patent law recognizes the importance of both embryonic inventions and co-operative 
investment by recognizing priority of invention based on the eureka moment but extending the 
time in which an inventor has to file for a patent so long as he or she is diligently pursuing its 30 
 
reduction to practice. 
11 The existence of a firm or firms with superior entrepreneurial capacity could, in fact, affect 
the long-run price and quantity in the industry if it (they) used sufficiently more or less of a 
scarce industry factor than the standard firms they displaced that the supply price of that input is 
changed at the output which would exist if there were only standard firms.  Textbook writers can 
be forgiven for deciding to leave that complication for advanced treatments. 
12 Since all the generic firms have exited in long-run equilibrium, our concerns about the source 
of the upward slope to the generic supply curve are irrelevant. 
13 In this case the supply curve of the generic industry SM￿1 is horizontal at P' and marginal 
revenue of firm 1 equals P' until the market demand curve DM falls below P'. 31 
Table 1 
Research & Development Expenditures and Gross Domestic Investment as Percentage of GDP 





Canada 1.6 25.0 6.3
France 2.2 24.7 9.0
Germany 2.5 24.0 10.4
Italy 1.1 22.6 4.8
Japan 2.6 32.5 8.1
United Kingdom 2.1 18.6 11.1
United States 2.6 21.3 12.3  
 
Sources:  R&D/GDP calculated by authors from data in National Science Board (2004), 
Appendix Table 4-43, p. A4-89. 
  GDI/GDP calculated by authors from Investment Share of CGDP [GDP in current 
prices] data from the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). 
  R&D/GDI calculated by authors as (R&D/GDP)/(GDI/GDP). 
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Table 2 
Summary of Results for Innovative Leader and Generic Imitators in Competitive Equilibrium 
 
Leader’s Cost Advantage (measured at minimum long-run average costs): 
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Leader’s Margin (exclusive of costs of creating technologies): 
 












where ￿AC is the arc elasticity of the leader’s average cost with respect to output and ￿MC 
is the arc elasticity of the leader’s marginal cost with respect to output.  Note that ￿AC ￿ 
￿MC/2 so long as the marginal cost curve is concave from above; thus the leader’s margin 
is expected exceed half of its cost advantage. 
 
Leader’s Scale Advantage (measured at minimum long-run average costs): 
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The leader’s output exceeds each generic-imitator firm’s output not only in proportion to 
the leader’s scale advantage but also by a factor which is increasing in the cost advantage 
and decreasing in the elasticity of the leader’s marginal cost with respect to output. 
 
Growth Rates of the Total Industry (in percent per annum): 
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where EM is the (negatively signed) price elasticity of market demand.  Entry or exit 
ensure  that  total  output  of  all  firms  grows  according  to  the  income-induced  shift  in 
demand G plus the movement along the market demand curve due to the market price fall 
at the rate R.  The growth rate of industry revenue accounts for the rate of price decrease. 
 
Growth Rate of Leader’s Market Share (in percent per annum): 
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The leader’s output (and each generic-imitator firm’s output) grows at the growth rate S 
of the leader’s scale advantage; its share grows depending on whether this is greater or 
less than the growth of industry output. 33 




Source: Lamkey (2005). 34 
Figure 2.  Long-run competitive equilibrium for industry with firm 
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Figure 3.  Long-run wealth-maximizing strategy for a dominant firm 




Figure 4.  Static welfare analysis for entry into a competitive 
industry by a dominant firm with proprietary technology 
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Figure  5.    Metamorphic  innovation  creates  monopoly  firm  with 
proprietary technology despite free entry of generic firms 
 
 38 
Figure  6.    Metamorphic  innovation  creates  monopoly  firm  with 
proprietary technology and limit pricing 
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Figure 7.  An Innovative Leader with Generic Imitators in 
Competitive Equilibrium 
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Figure 8.  Monopolist with Ongoing Metamorphic Innovation 
 
 